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  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 A jury found that Defendant Sidney Katz was not liable in negligence for 
allegedly maintaining a moldy office building in which Plaintiffs worked.  
Plaintiffs’ primary argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in not 
granting them partial summary judgment on the basis of non-mutual offensive 
collateral estoppel.1  We will affirm. 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 1 “Non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, now usually called issue 
preclusion, is a branch of res judicata doctrine which prevents in certain 
circumstances re-litigation of issues previously decided against one of the parties. 
Application is ‘non-mutual’ where the party asserting preclusion was not a party to 
the prior case, and it is termed ‘offensive’ when used by a plaintiff to bind a 
defendant.”  Brown v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 613 F.3d 44, 48 n.2 
(1st Cir. 2010). 
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 On June 18, 2012, Defendant Katz was held liable to Lorraine Smith in a 
separate action based on, at the very least, similar allegations.  See Smith v. Katz, 
No. 2010-39, 2013 WL 1182074 (D.V.I. Mar. 22, 2013).  Thereafter, Plaintiffs 
repeatedly moved for partial summary judgment in this case on the basis of the 
Smith verdict.  A threshold requirement for invoking collateral estoppel is that an 
“identical issue was previously adjudicated.”2  On May 8, 2013, the District Court, 
understanding the Plaintiffs to be asking for preclusion on all four prongs of their 
negligence causes of action (duty, breach, causation and damages), refused to 
apply preclusion on the obvious grounds that whether Plaintiffs here (as opposed to 
Smith alone) suffered any injury caused by mold in the building was not 
adjudicated in the Smith action.  See Richards v. Marshall, No. 2009-23, 2013 WL 
1901637, at *3 (D.V.I. May 8, 2013).  After Plaintiffs argued in a motion for 
reconsideration that they did not mean to seek preclusion on the causation and 
damages prongs, the District Court again declined to apply collateral estoppel, this 
time on the grounds that Plaintiffs “have not produced any competent evidence” to 
allow the District Court “to say at this time whether the relationship between the 
                                                 
 2 Newman v. McKay, 58 V.I. 170 (V.I. Super. June 18, 2013).  Although the 
Smith judgment was rendered by a federal court and the preclusive effect of such a 
decision is governed by federal common law, the Supreme Court has determined 
that where the prior action was a diversity action the federal rule is to apply the 
preclusion law of the ‘state’ in which the federal court sits.  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001). 
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Plaintiffs and [Defendant] is identical to that shared by Smith and [Defendant].”  
Richards v. Marshall, No. CV 2009-23, 2013 WL 4028453, at *3 (D.V.I. Aug. 1, 
2013). 
 Plaintiffs did not respond by offering any such evidence to the District 
Court, nor by asking the District Court to instruct the jury that if it found that 
Plaintiffs were similarly situated to Smith that it should find that Defendant was 
negligent, nor by asking the District Court to include on the jury’s special verdict 
form a question about whether the Plaintiffs were similarly situated to Smith.  
Moreover, because the Plaintiffs did not file a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, we 
are powerless to review the trial record.  See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 189 
(2011). 
 However, the District Court did acknowledge that at least one issue was 
“identical” in both cases:  whether there was mold in the building capable of 
causing injury to employees who worked in the building.  Richards, 2013 WL 
1901637, at *4.  Nonetheless the District Court, having noted that “it is unclear 
how granting summary judgment on the issue of [the capability of the mold to 
cause injury] will save substantial time and resources [because] Plaintiffs would 
likely have to elicit at least some testimony as to [the capability of the mold to 
cause injury] in order to prove specific causation,” declined to apply preclusion as 
to that issue alone.  Id.  Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the District 
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Court abused its discretion in declining to apply non-mutual offensive collateral 
estoppel.  See Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 
249 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Finally, although Plaintiffs did not object to the District Court’s jury 
instructions on the grounds that they were confusing, they now invite us, based on 
nothing other than rampant speculation, to assume that the jury may have 
disregarded the District Court’s explicit instructions.  No such assumption is 
warranted. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment entered by the District Court. 
